Water in the Jordan Basin has been a key factor in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, and between Israel and its neighbors. Efficient water use requires cooperation rather than confrontation. In this paper, we explore sharing water through a negotiation game between Arabs and Israelis. We estimate a set of optimum Pareto allocations, as well as identifying a range of negotiated solutions. Our results suggest that viable solutions would improve incomes by some 20% compared to the current status quo. These solutions are close to the long-standing Johnston Plan proposal, which still provides a useful benchmark today.
source of political tension between Arabs and Israelis, Indians and Bangladeshis, Americans and Mexicans, and between the 10 riparian states of the Nile Basin Wolf (1999) . Furthermore, the situation looks unlikely to improve in the future.
Because of its climatic and hydrological characteristics, the Middle East has always been particularly sensitive to water problems. In the last century, indeed, water as much as oil played a determining role in the delineation of borders throughout the region. The hydrological geography of the region, and to a great degree its history, have been formed by three major river systems. These are the Nile Basin in Africa, the Tigris-Euphrates system in what used to be called Mesopotamia and the Jordan, which currently flows through the territory of Palestine, Israel, Jordan, Syria and the Lebanon.
In its beginnings, the Arab-Israeli conflict may have been an argument about land, but little by little the scarcity of water and its capacity to boost the value added in farming have turned water from an essential, if scarce, good into a key geopolitical resource and a determining factor in the evolution of the dispute. Competition for control of water resources began with the partition of Palestine and the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, resulting in the unilateral implementation of hydrological plans.
Thus, the control of water has been a high strategic priority in the policies of both Israel and the Arabs, to the point where it was probably one of the factors that undermined negotiations following the Madrid Peace Conference, despite the significant progress made on territorial issues.
Theoreticians of water wars have frequently pointed to control of the Jordan's water as one of the motives for the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 (Six Days War), 1978 (Operation Litani) and 1982 (invasion of the Lebanon). In the 1967 war, Israel not only made territorial gains but also improved its hydro-strategic position among the riparian states of the Jordan Valley. The territory occupied allowed Israel almost complete control of the River Jordan, while the occupation of the Golan Heights (Syria) gave it access to two of its main tributaries, the Banias and the Dan, as well as other streams in the Upper Jordan and even a part of the Yarmouk river. Meanwhile, the occupation of the West Bank brought three major aquifers under Israeli control, which currently supply over one third of the country's annual consumption. These aquifers are currently a key issue in peace negotiations. These events unquestionably raised political tensions between the Palestinians and Israel, because they blocked Palestinian access to river water from the Jordan and seriously restricted the available ground water in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
However, we do not believe that water can remain a permanent source of tension between people living in the same territory. Rather, we consider that it can and should be a catalyst for cooperation, not conflict. Efficient water use requires cooperation rather than confrontation. Thus, the ecological, holistic approach to river systems that the EU is seeking to generalize throughout the member States through the Water Framework Directive requires cooperation for integrated management.
Taking an optimistic stance, we propose in this paper a tentative model for water sharing in the Jordan Basin using a negotiation game with two players, namely Arabs and Israelis. We shall consider some possible solutions in a very simple framework (regular and general Nash, Kalai-Smorodinsky and the Johnston Plan). These proposals are not, and cannot be, directly applicable, but they may perhaps point the way to finding a future solution for the inhabitants of the Jordan Basin. To this end, we briefly describe the Jordan Basin in terms of its hydrology and water-use patterns in the next section. Section three sets out the ground rules for the game and reviews some of the admissible conditions for a fair allocation of water resources. The fourth section proposes four highly significant, possible solutions. These are then fleshed out with certain other solutions in section five. We end the paper with our conclusions and final remarks.
II. THE JORDAN BASIN

II.1 Hydrology of the Jordan Basin
The Jordan flows through five countries, the Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Palestine and Israel. It rises at Mount Hermon (Jabel al-Sheikh, 2,814 m) in the southwest of the Anti-Lebanon range, which forms the country's border with Syria. The three main tributaries of the Upper Jordan also rise at Mount Hermon. These are the Hasbani, which rises in the Lebanon and flows through its territory for some 21 km, the Banias, which rises in Syria (Golan Heights), and the Dan in northern Israel. See Figure 1 . The Upper Jordan is formed by the confluence of these three tributaries and then runs southward through a series of deep gorges flowing at a rate of 600-800 hm 3 into Lake Tiberiades (Sea of Galilee).
Some ten kilometers downstream of Lake Tiberiades, the river is joined by its largest tributary, the Yarmouk (475 hm 3 /year), which flows down from Syria and marks its border with Jordan for some 40 km, before separating Israel and Jordan in the Yarmouk Triangle for a distance of 7 km. Joined by the Yarmouk and a number of other small streams, the river forms the Lower Jordan, which empties into the Dead Sea, 417 m below sea level with a natural flow of 1,325 to 1,600 hm 3 /year. The Jordan drains an area of some 18,300 km 2 over a distance of around 360 km from its source to its end at the Dead Sea.
Figure 1. The Jordan River Basin
Israel currently exploits practically all of the waters of the Upper Jordan, representing some 650-700 hm 3 /year, which are diverted by the National Water Carrier (NWC). This canal runs from Lake Tiberiades to the Mediterranean and the Negev Desert. Israel also draws of 100 hm 3 /year from the Yarmouk river.
Ghor Canal. Syria too draws off around 160-170 hm 3 /year from the upper Yarmouk.
The Palestinians, meanwhile, have been strictly prohibited from using water from the River Jordan since the occupation of the West Bank in 1976. Finally, the Lebanon uses a very small amount of water, varying between 5-10 hm3/year from the Upper Jordan.
It is currently estimated that around 110-300 hm 3 /year reach the Dead Sea, compared to some 1325-1600 hm 3 /year before the massive diversion of water via the NWC and the East Ghor Canal, as well as the water taken from the Yarmouk by Syria.
The Dead Sea is now in peril due to these diversions and the mining industries located around its shores, as the water level falls and the lake shrinks. Indeed, the water level is now falling at the alarming rate of between 80 cm and 100 cm per year, Baer et al. (2002) . We shall not consider this grave situation in this paper, although that will not prevent us from returning to the issue in future research. The low proportion of herbaceous crops in the Arab irrigation structure is a consequence of several different factors. In Palestine, it was caused by the restrictions placed on Palestinian access to water since 1967, the low economic return on herbaceous crops and, finally, the Arab farmers' fear that their land may be confiscated by the Israelis on the grounds that it is not cultivated.
In Jordan, the switch towards more profitable crops has also largely been due to the relative water shortage in the Jordan Basin, and to the higher returns earned on fruit, olives and vegetables.
This crop structure and industrial uses of water have given rise to the current pattern of water use in the region, which is shown in Table 3 
III. KEY ELEMENTS OF THE NEGOTIATION GAME AND FAIRNESS CRITERIA
In order to obtain and interpret the different solutions to the game, we need the utility functions for each player, possible negotiating alternatives and a set of criteria allowing the evaluation of results. These matters are dealt with in this section.
III.1 Utility or payment functions for Arabs and Israelis
As Table 3 shows, the percentage of water used in agriculture is very similar for both players. In view of this, and of the predominance of agricultural water use, as well as certain weaknesses in the data available, we shall use agricultural returns as the basis for the utility functions.
The farm data for the three countries with which we are concerned ( The adjustments for Israel and the Arabs are respectively expressed as follows: 
III.2 Negotiation set
Let us for the moment pass over the break-off point for both players and concentrate on defining the possible negotiating alternatives between the Arabs and the Israelis, which is to say the set of efficient Pareto alternatives. The negotiation set will, therefore, be the set of efficient points that do not result in utilities below the break-off point.
We assume that these points are associated with a greater or lesser transfer of the water used between the agents, since an increase in the available water can hardly be supposed given the ecological problems facing the Dead Sea. For reasons of realism, we shall moreover suppose that transfers are possible only in one direction -from Israel to the Arabs.
We also assume that the Israelis will always transfer the water providing the lowest return, while the water received will be used by the Arabs to expand their agriculture without changing crop patterns. This conjecture seems reasonable, given that the share of herbaceous crops farmed by the Arabs is relatively small, and that it is not easy to raise a product's market share quickly.
Consequently, if x is the amount of water transferred, the water available to each player in an efficient solution will be: and for ease of use we shall apply the expression in the calculation and representation processes.
III.3 Fairness criteria identified by International Water Law
The "fair water sharing" is a necessary principle for any water allocation, but it is one of the most difficult to define, given the multitude of variables that should be taken into account. A fair allocation means that each country has the right to a reasonable and fair part in the use of shared waters. The term "fair" does not imply equality of use, but refers rather to a range of factors, including population, hydrology, climate and current uses, which must be taken into account in the allocation of water resources. Table 4 sets out fair factors inspired in the Helsinki Rules developed by the International Law Association in relation to the fair use of water, as well as the criteria we have used to apply them in the present case. Following the work of Mimi and Sawalhi (2003) , we have obtained nine fair allocations, which are given in Table 5 and represented graphically in Figure 4 . As can be seen in Figure 4 , eight of the criteria are within the bounds of the set 
VI. FOUR SIGNIFICANT GAME SOLUTIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARABS
As a first step, let us assume that the break-off point for both players is the unavailability of water, therefore representing zero utility. On this assumption, we find four possible solutions, all based on the negotiating set and all revealing. Two are Nash negotiating solutions Nash (1953) with and without lateral payments. The third is the Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, and the fourth is the proposal made in the Johnston Plan.
IV.1 Regular Nash solution without lateral payments and break-off at (0;0)
In his investigation of negotiation between two players, Nash (1953) 
4-Independence of irrelevant alternatives
Under these conditions, Nash showed that a unique solution exists, which maximizes the product of gains (utility less utility at the break-off level) for each player.
Where gains have exponents equal to one, the solution is defined as regular. If, however, the exponents are different, the solution obtained is said to be general, and the exponent represents a measure of the negotiating power of each player.
In this case (regular solution without lateral payments), the negotiation set consists of the efficient points defined by with non-negative components. See Figure 4 , point S1 is situated to the left of point SQ.
IV.2 Nash solution with lateral payments and break-off at (0;0)
Assuming, in the context of negotiation games, that both Israel and the Arabs, the two players, can make lateral payments (i.e. mutual transfers of income), it is clear that the negotiating set will differ from that considered in the preceding case.
Meanwhile, only solutions in which both players receive non-negative amounts and that add up in total to the maximum obtainable income will be considered negotiable. In other words, the Nash solution is that of the following problem: , where the joint utility at SQ is 1038.76.
The maximum level of joint utility is obtained at point , which is a tangential to the aforementioned parallel line. This is the point at which Figure 4 . The joint income produced is €1250.313 million, which is close to the amount obtained at S1(€1246.25 million) and at S2 and S max (€1253.05 million), and it results in a gain of approximately 20% in income for the Arabs compared to the initial status quo.
IV.4 Johnston Plan (1953-1955)
In 1953 the US President Dwight David Eisenhower asked Ambassador Eric
Johnston to seek a solution that would be acceptable to both the Arabs and the Israelis.
His proposal is known in the literature as the Johnston Plan.
Despite the approval of the last draft of the Johnston Plan by the technical committees of both parties, it was never actually ratified by either. The Arabs eventually This is surprisingly close, indeed practically identical, to solution S1 = (568.72; 677.53), proving the validity of the proposal made in the Johnston Plan, which 50 years on could still be rationally defended.
V. OTHER SOLUTIONS IN THE NEGOTIATION GAME BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARABS
In the above solutions we have assumed that the break-off point was the unavailability of any water, and that the players had no power to exert pressure. If these two factors change, so too do the solutions. Let us now look at the possible solutions, both in order to estimate the influence of these conditions and to consider the meaning of the solutions we have obtained.
V.1 Regular Nash solutions with break-off points ≠ (0; 0)
Let us find the negotiating solutions to the problem: S3 is the best outcome for the Arabs and S5 the worst. Solution S3 is somewhat better for the Arabs than JP, but significantly worse than the fair situation, F2, with regard to which the break-off point is defined. In comparison with F2, the best outcome for Israel is Nash solution S3. Nash solution S4 is very close to solution JP, used as the benchmark to define break-off. Finally, S5 improves the conditions of the fairness criterion F4 but is still a fairly long way from JP. Figure 4 shows the break-off points R3, R4 and R5 and S3, S4 and S5 respectively.
V.2 General Nash solutions
Up to this point, we have considered regular Nash negotiating solutions in which both players have the same negotiating power. To put this another way, the game treated both players symmetrically. In reality, however, players usually have different levels of negotiating power, and this assumption may be an appropriate avenue to approach the situation considered here, which is the sharing of water between Israel and the Arabs.
The general Nash problem would be as follows: As might have been expected, the players increase their gains where they have greater negotiating power. The generalized Nash solutions in which the Arabs have greater negotiating power (SA2, SA3, SA4, SA5, SA6 and SA9) are situated increasingly to the left of S1. In contrast, the generalized solutions that are favorable to Israel (SI2, SI3, SI4, SI5) are at some distance to the right of S1. We may note here that certain solutions based on a specific negotiating power may coincide approximately with the allocation of some of the fair allocation factors. See Figure 4 .
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL REMARKS
As mentioned in the introduction, the use of water has been a key political factor In this paper, we have proposed an approximation to such a possible agreement using a simple Nash-type negotiation game, in which Israel and the Arabs are the two players seeking an efficient solution to the division of their common water resources. It should not be forgotten, however, that this is merely a theoretical exercise, and that any on-the-ground solution would involve many other factors.
The negotiating problem was formulated by employing standard gross margins on farming as the utilities. It was then solved for different break-off points in order to take different approximations into account. In view of its undoubted interest, we have also considered the solution proposed in the Johnston Plan, as well as those associated with various fair distribution criteria identified in International Water Law. The maximum joint productivity is obtained and S max , where each party receives the benefits generated. This is therefore the best technical alternative in the absence of mutual compensation. At S max the return on each unit of water transferred to the Arabs is identical to that obtained on the last unit transferred by the Israelis.
At SQ each player obtains our estimate of current returns (i.e. it represents the current status quo), generating joint utility of €1038.759 million.
If Arab utility is taken as the indicator, the intermediate efficient point would be PM = (642.95; 556.87). Based on these three points (S max , PM and SQ), the set of efficient distributions may be split into three: above S max , between S max and PM, and between PM and SQ. In the first of these cases, all Israeli crops generate a higher return per unit of water than the average for the Arabs, while the third reflects the allocations with the lowest Israeli returns. Nevertheless, the average return remains higher than that obtained by the Arabs. Specifically, the return for the Israelis at SQ is €0.70/m 3 compared to €0.64/m 3 for the Arabs.
All of the allocations that meet the fairness criterion are situated above S max with the exception of F4. Consequently, we may affirm that this is the area in which any fair distribution should be located if no other criteria are considered. This requires some qualification, however, given the higher return on Israeli crops in the efficient allocations situated above S max , in which all crops are above the average Arab return.
Finally, it should be remembered that the simulations presented do not take the potential productivity gains that could be achieved in Arab farming into account, but maintain the same crop patterns and, therefore, a fixed average return.
The most significant solutions obtained fall between S max and PM, which suggests that this is the area in which a real-world solution should be sought.
Meanwhile, the best solutions from a technical standpoint are those that are closest to S max . On the one hand, we find the simplest Nash solution (regular with null break-off points), which is S1 = (568.72; 677.53), practically the same as the solution JP = (575.79; 674.71) for the Johnston Plan.
The Nash solution obtained where compensation between the parties are assumed also presents very similar values and is located in the same area. This is solution S2 (625.525; 625.525) . In this case, payment would be made by the Arabs to the Israelis, since the highest return on joint production is obtained at S max and the Arabs should therefore compensate the Israelis in some way for the use of water. Let us note here that Arab income in this case is lower than in the S1 and JP solutions.
Finally, the Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, SK = (538.56; 711.75), also falls in this area, giving the Arabs somewhat more than S1, S2 and JP.
Nevertheless, the overall utility of the four solutions is very similar, and all of them would result in an increase of approximately 20% compared to the current status quo. All of this suggests that the 1955 Johnston Plan could be revisited as a starting point for present-day negotiations.
Indeed, the Plan has always been considered a consensus or benchmark position, despite the fact that it was never ratified by either party. Over the whole history of the conflict, in fact, it has been taken as a point of reference for the river basin, at least in Israel and Jordan. It has helped both sides implement their respective water projects separately in a context of agreement, even though Syria and the Lebanon never undertook any public works within the framework proposed in the Plan. Since the West
Bank was a part of Jordan in 1955, the resources allocated to the area in the Jordan Plan could today provide a framework for negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.
Turning to the third group of efficient solutions, which are those located between PM and SQ, we find the fair solution F4 and the generalized solutions SI3, SI4 and SI5.
These are therefore Pareto allocations, which maintain situations close to the status quo and could only be maintained given significant Israeli negotiating power. This probably makes them unsustainable in the long run. The reasons are simple: these solutions are some way from the technical optimum (S max ), and negotiating strength is not a historical constant.
In light of the above, we may venture to affirm by way of a final conclusion that the Arabs and Israelis need to progress towards the allocation of shared water resources along the lines proposed many years ago in the Johnston Plan. This would unquestionably require some adjustment to make room for modern approaches to integrated, sustainable management, but the Plan proposals appear to provide an acceptable combination of the possible, the technical and the socially desirable.
Finally, we should not forget that the Jordan Basin and its main components, Lake Tiberiades and the Dead Sea, are key to the history and beliefs of Muslims,
Christians and Jews alike. The historical and cultural worth of the Dead Sea, not to mention its environmental and esthetic value, exceptionally low altitude (417 m below
